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Abstract
This paper examines effects of MiFID II on European stock markets. We study the effects
of the new tick size regime, both intraday and in the closing auction. An increase (decrease)
in tick size is associated with a decrease (increase) in intraday liquidity, but a more (less)
stable market. In the closing auction an increase in tick size has a positive effect on liquidity.
Moreover, we report a positive relationship between tick size and transacted volume, in
particular in the closing auction. Finally, closing auction volumes increased heavily since
MiFID II and price formation in closing auctions became more efficient.
JEL Codes: G10, G14, G15, G18, D44.
Key Words: MiFID II, price formation, price efficiency, tick size, closing auction, closing
prices.
1 Introduction
At the outset of the year 2018, the new regulations for European financial markets, called the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), came into force. MiFID II is the
successor of the original MiFID1 regulations and is introduced in order to create fairer, safer,
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we are grateful to Oleg Kozlovski and Victor Harmsen for providing help on data related issues and to Remco
Peters for his insights on closing auction mechanisms.
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1The original MiFID regulations applied since November 2007, aiming for better protection of investors.
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more efficient and more transparent markets. In this article the effects of MiFID II on trading
stocks belonging to the STOXX Europe 600 index2 (hereafter referred to as the STOXX600),
are examined. We study the effects of the new tick size regime and also report significant effects
that are not related to the tick size regulations, especially in the closing auction.
Several parts of MiFID II are relevant to stock trading and market microstructure. An important
part of the regulations is a new tick size regime.3 The tick size refers to the smallest possible
price increment when trading an asset. During the last decade, exchanges have reduced their
tick sizes in order to create tighter bid-ask spreads. However, since a few years it is recognized
that this has had a negative effect on the quality of the market. That is why with MiFID II a
new tick size regime was introduced, setting a minimum tick size for every traded instrument on
every exchange in Europe, taking into account the price and liquidity of the instrument. Other
relevant parts of MiFID II include the double volume cap (DVC) and the best execution rule.
The DVC limits the volume that is allowed to be traded in the so-called dark pools (private
exchanges in which liquidity is not visible a priori), in order to protect the transparency of the
market.4 The best execution rule mandates intermediaries to obtain the best possible price when
executing a client’s order.5 A similar rule already existed in the previous MiFID regulations,
but the obligation to prove fulfillment has become much more urgent, possibly changing the
way orders are executed.
We first study the effects of the new tick size regime. The French regulator did a first examina-
tion of the effects of the new tick size regime and concluded the regime had positive effects on
liquidity and market stability, see AMF (2018). There already exists a large body of literature
on the effects of changes in tick size, most of it based on the change to decimal pricing in the
2The STOXX Europe 600 index has 600 components from 17 different European countries, it represents
European small, mid and large cap stocks.
3The new tick size regime is introduced in Article 49 of MiFID II, see https://www.esma.europa.eu/
databases-library/interactive-single-rulebook/mifid-ii/article-49
4Only 8% of the total transacted volume (over all trading venues) in a stock is allowed to be carried out in dark
pools, and only 4% of the total transacted volume is allowed to be carried out in a single dark pool. This is stated
in Article 5 of MiFIR, see https://www.esma.europa.eu/databases-library/interactive-single-rulebook/
mifir/article-5
5This is stated in Article 27 of MiFID II, see https://www.esma.europa.eu/databases-library/
interactive-single-rulebook/mifid-ii/article-27
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US in 2001 (see e.g. Bessembinder (2003); Chakravarty et al. (2004, 2005) and many others),
but also on other moments in time and other exchanges (see e.g. Anderson and Peng (2014);
Bacidore (1997); Ronen and Weaver (2001)). See Verousis et al. (2018) for a very recent and
exhaustive review of the literature on tick sizes. Most of the existing literature on this subject
is relatively old (before the rise of high frequency trading) and/or based on only trade- and best
bid/ask-data. However, very recently a new line of studies emerged that investigate stocks that
were subject to the tick size pilot in the US6 (see for example Chung et al. (2020) and Griffith
and Roseman (2019), among others). In today’s financial markets most securities are traded in
continuous double auctions. However, to determine a daily closing price, a closing call auction
is often used. In these closing auctions orders are collected for a while without giving rise to
trades immediately, after which a closing price is determined and every possible transaction is
conducted against this price.7 All of the abovementioned studies focus on the effects of tick
size changes on intraday continuous trading, but none of them studies the effects of tick size on
trading in the closing call auction. In this article, we fill this gap by studying the effects of the
new tick size regime on both intraday continuous trading and trading in the closing auction.
An increasingly large part of the daily transacted volume is transacted in the closing auction,
implying that studying the call auction gets even more important. Unfortunately, the literature
on the call auction is fairly scarce compared to the enormous (both empirical and theoretical)
literature on continuous trading. Recent theoretical contributions are by Muni Toke (2015) and
Derksen et al. (2020), while the empirical literature mainly focuses on the effects of call auction
mechanisms on price formation and the difference with continuous trading (see e.g. Hillion and
Suominen (2004); Kandel et al. (2012); Pagano and Schwartz (2003), among others).
We study how liquidity, transacted volumes, volatility and market stability are affected by a
change in tick size, for both intraday trading and in the closing auction. We find that the
increase in depth after an increase in tick size can not offset the contemporaneous increase in
bid-ask spread (except for very large orders), implying that intraday liquidity for small orders is
6In 2016 the US Securities and Exchange Commission launched the Tick Size Pilot Program as an experiment
to assess the effects of an increase in tick size, for illiquid stocks mainly.
7See appendix A for more information on closing auction mechanisms.
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negatively affected by an increase in tick size, while it is positively affected by a decrease in tick
size (in line with for example Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000)). In the closing auction there is no
bid-ask spread, but depth still increases, leading to improved liquidity in closing auctions after
an increase in tick size. Furthermore, we find that an increase (decrease) in tick size leads to a
moderate increase (decrease) in intraday transacted volumes and a strong increase (decrease)
in transacted volumes in the closing auction. Finally, we show that an increase (decrease) in
tick size has a positive (negative) effect on the stability of the market.
Moreover, we also document significant post-MiFID II effects that can not be attributed to the
tick size regime, especially in the closing auction. We find that since the introduction of MiFID
II an increasing part of the daily transacted volume is transacted in the closing auction, mainly
driven by an increase in limit order volume, not market order volume. Along with the increase in
volumes, price deviations in the closing auction increased. Pre-MiFID II a high absolute return
in the closing auction was followed by a correction the next day, but post-MiFID II this mean
reversion has vanished. These observations suggest that the extra volume in the closing auctions
contributes to price formation and makes closing prices more efficient, ruling out the possibility
that the extra volume is caused by the increase in passive investing. We find no evidence that
the DVC rule has caused volume to move from dark pools to the regular exchanges (in line with
Johann et al. (2019)) and we propose the best execution rule as a possible explanation of the
observed effects.
This paper constitutes a first large scale examination of the effects of MiFID II on European
equity trading, documenting both expected and unexpected consequences of this regulatory
intervention, which are of interest to academics, policy makers and market practitioners. Par-
ticular focus goes to tick size effects, especially regarding the influence of tick sizes in the
closing call auction (rather than intraday continuous trading, which has been the exclusive fo-
cus of most existing literature). In addition, we investigate the effects of tick size on market
stability, a topic that has received less attention in the literature. Finally, we contribute to the
literature on call auctions, by studying tick size effects and the efficiency of price formation in
the closing auction.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 2 we formulate several testable
hypotheses on how the new tick size regime can affect trading in the intraday continuous market
and in the closing auction. In section 3 the data is discussed and the method is explained. In
sections 4 and 5 the effects of the new tick size regime are examined. In section 6 we discuss
post-MiFID II effects that can not be attributed to the new tick size regime. Finally, in section
7 the results are summarized and concluding remarks are made. In appendix A information on
different closing auction mechanisms can be found and appendix B reports results on the effects
of the DVC rule.
2 Hypotheses development
In this section we will formulate testable hypotheses for the effects of the new tick size regime
on intraday continuous trading and on trading in the closing auction.
2.1 Liquidity, trading costs and transacted volume
There exists a large empirical literature on the relationship between tick size and liquidity.
Generally, the focus is on the bid-ask spread (defined as the difference between the lowest ask
price and the highest bid price) and market depth (the volume that is accumulated in the
order book). The literature unanimously shows that a higher (lower) minimum tick size leads
to a higher (lower) bid-ask spread and higher (lower) volumes at the best bid and ask (see
e.g. Alampieski and Lepone (2009); Ap Gwilym et al. (2005); Biais et al. (2010); Bollen and
Whaley (1998); Chan and Hwang (2002); Chung et al. (2005); Hsieh et al. (2008); Van Ness
et al. (2000), among others). An increase (decrease) in spread after an increase (decrease) in
tick size, is generally explained by the extent to which the tick size is a binding constraint for
the spread: if the spread is oftentimes only one tick, an increase in tick size will mechanically
increase the spread, while a decrease in tick size will offer the opportunity to quote lower spreads.
Even if the tick size is not binding the spread, market participants can place limit orders at
tighter prices when the tick size is lower. Reflecting this second argument, Bessembinder (2000)
5
finds that spread and tick size are also positively related when the tick size is non-binding.
Furthermore, a positive relationship between depth and tick size is explained by the following
arguments. Volumes at the best bid and ask will be higher when the tick size is higher, because
a coarser price grid will cause volume to concentrate more on the same price level. Also, the
cost of front running increases with the tick size, making it more likely a market participant
decides to join the queue, instead of crossing or tightening the spread. Following Goldstein and
Kavajecz (2000), we associate a decrease in spread with improved liquidity for smaller orders,
while increased depth suggests improved liquidity for larger orders. We study the tradeoff
between spread and depth by investigating the price impact of market orders of increasing size.
The first hypothesis thus is as follows.
Intraday Hypothesis 1 After an increase (decrease) in tick size, the bid-ask spread and
market depth will increase (decrease). Consequently, the trading costs for small trades increase
(decrease) with an increase (decrease) in tick size, while trading costs for large trades decrease
(increase).
In the closing call auction there is no bid-ask spread, because bid and ask quotes overlap during
the accumulation phase of the auction. However, the limit order book just after the clearing
of the auction can be interpreted in a similar way. The post auction spread (defined as the
bid-ask spread observed just after clearing) measures liquidity around the closing price: when
this spread is large, the range of possible clearing prices is large, indicating that an extra market
order might have altered the closing price strongly. But even more than in continuous trading,
depth determines how easily the price is moved: when volume in the post auction limit book
is large, an extra market order would have zero price impact. This is an important difference
with continuous trading, where crossing the spread always induces trading costs, independent of
order size. Similar to the case of intraday trading, we expect tick size and depth to be positively
related, because a higher tick size causes volume to concentrate more on the same price level.
We hypothesize that depth is a more important determinant of auction liquidity than the post
auction spread and we study the tradeoff by looking at price impact. We thus propose the
following hypothesis.
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Closing Auction Hypothesis 1 An increase (decrease) in tick size will lead to a higher
(lower) post auction spread and to higher (lower) depth. Consequently, an increase (decrease)
in tick size will have a positive (negative) effect on closing auction liquidity.
As we have seen, the relationship between tick size and intraday liquidity is rather complex
(basically a tradeoff between spread and depth), which raises the question how this affects
transacted volume. The relationship between tick size and transacted volume (if it exists) is
not well understood in the literature. Niemeyer and Sand˚as (1994) find (some) evidence that
tick size and transacted volume are negatively related, a relationship that is also predicted by
the theoretical work of Harris (1994) and Goettler et al. (2005). This negative relationship is
supported by the compelling argument that lower tick sizes lead to lower spreads, causing market
participants to trade more. On the other hand, the zero intelligence model (where traders make
decisions exogenously) of Chiarella and Iori (2002) predicts that transacted volume and tick size
are positively related. Indeed, if traders do not alter their decisions based on the changing tick
size, a larger tick size will cause more orders to be rounded to the same price, making matching
of buy and sell orders more likely. In line with this argument, Chakravarty et al. (2004) find
that transacted volumes decrease after a decrease in tick size. However, Ahn et al. (1996, 2007),
Anderson and Peng (2014), Bacidore (1997), Gerace et al. (2012) and Ke et al. (2004) do not
find evidence of effects of tick size reduction on transacted volumes. More recently, O’Hara et
al. (2018) also find that total transacted volume is not affected by the tick size and the AMF
(2018) finds that transacted volumes are not impacted by the new tick size regime. Clearly,
there is no consensus on the relationship between tick size and transacted volume, but most
empirical evidence (and importantly, very recent evidence) suggests that there is no significant
relationship between tick size and transacted volume. Based on this, we propose the following
hypothesis.
Intraday Hypothesis 2 A change in tick size will not affect the intraday transacted volume.
In the closing auction, there is no bid-ask spread, ruling out the channel through which a
decrease in tick size may have a positive effect on transacted volume. On the other hand,
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the reasoning that a larger tick size may lead to larger transacted volumes, because it will
cause more orders to overlap, does still hold. This mechanical argument is even stronger in the
closing auction, where less interaction between market participants is possible. So we propose
the following hypothesis.
Closing Auction Hypothesis 2 An increase (decrease) in tick size will have a positive
(negative) effect on transacted volume in the closing auction.
2.2 Volatility and market stability
Most of the relevant empirical literature suggests that a higher (lower) tick size leads to higher
(lower) volatility (see e.g. Hau (2006); Ke et al. (2004); Ronen and Weaver (2001)). This is
also in line with Intraday Hypothesis 1 on bid-ask spreads, as higher spreads are associated
with higher volatility (see e.g. Ke et al. (2004)). Furthermore, a positive relationship between
tick size and volatility is also supported by theoretical results of Chiarella and Iori (2002), who
argue that an increase in minimal price change will lead to a linear increase in price deviations.
So our hypothesis concerning volatility reads as follows.
Intraday Hypothesis 3 Volatility will increase (decrease) after an increase (decrease) in tick
size.
Concerning the closing auction, we are interested in the absolute deviation of the closing price
with respect to the price just before the auction, as a measure of the auction’s volatility. Again,
we expect that a higher tick size will lead to larger price deviations, because the minimal price
change is larger. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis.
Closing Auction Hypothesis 3 Absolute auction returns will increase (decrease) after an
increase (decrease) in tick size.
Finally, we will adress the issue of market stability. One of the aims of the new tick size regime
was to create a more stable market, as it was noted that too small tick sizes lead to unstable
markets (Laruelle et al., 2018). To reduce microstructural noise, a lower number of bid-ask price
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changes and a lower number of (small) trades, combined with a higher trade size are desired
and this should be achieved by an increase in tick size. A larger tick size will increase the cost
of front running and the cost of crossing the spread, which leads to less microstructural noise
(frequent small price movements). We therefore formulate the following hypothesis.
Intraday Hypothesis 4 An increase (decrease) in tick size will have a positive (negative)
effect on the stability of the market: an increase (decrease) in tick size will lead to a decrease
(increase) in the number of best bid-ask price updates and the number of (small) trades.
In the closing auction less microstructural noise would mean that the indication price is updated
less often during the auction, reflecting a more stable price formation.8 The corresponding
hypothesis is as follows.
Closing Auction Hypothesis 4 An increase (decrease) in tick size will be followed by a
decrease (increase) in the number of indication price updates, reflecting a more stable price
formation process.
3 Data and method
Two years (2017 and 2018, before and after the new regulations) of intraday order book data
(minimal 5 levels deep on both sides) and transaction data is obtained for all constituents of
the STOXX600 index. The STOXX600 consists of 600 components, representing 17 countries
in Europe9. Some stocks in the STOXX600 are traded on several exchanges and in different
currencies, we only consider trading on their European primary exchanges10. The stocks are
divided into three groups, based on the market capitalization of the stock, which leads to 200
8During the closing auction, indication price and volume are released continuously, indicating the price and
volume if the auction would be cleared at that time. See appendix A for more information on auction mechanisms
and rules.
9Those are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Around 75% of the
index is listed on Euronext (Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels, London, Oslo, Dublin, Lisbon), XETRA, SIX or Borsa
Italiana.
10Some companies have multiple European primary exchanges (e.g. Unilever is listed in both Amsterdam and
London), in that case we choose the one with the highest trading volume (on average).
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small cap stocks, 200 mid cap stocks and 200 large cap stocks. Stocks that were not in the
STOXX600 index for one of the years are excluded.
To examine the effects of the new tick size regime, the stocks are divided into groups based on
the way their tick size is affected by this new regime: a group of which the tick size increased
(ts↑), a group of which the tick size decreased (ts↓) and a group of which the tick size remained
unchanged (ts↔). The last group acts as a control group for the other two groups. Because
tick sizes can (as well in the old as in the new tick size regime) also change during a calendar
year due to changes in the stock price, the groups have the following definitions.
• ts↑: every stock whose average tick size over 2018 is a factor11 1.5 higher than its average
tick size over 2017. This group contains 179 stocks, of which 64 small caps, 68 mid caps
and 47 large caps.
• ts↓: every stock whose average tick size over 2017 is a factor 1.5 higher than its average
tick size over 2018. This group contains 144 stocks, of which 42 small caps, 43 mid caps
and 59 large caps.
• ts↔: all other stocks. This group contains 220 stocks, of which 80 small caps, 70 mid
caps and 70 large caps.
In table 1 the average tick size change and the average market capitalization of the groups is
shown.
Small cap stocks Mid cap stocks Large cap stocks
∆tick size market cap ∆tick size market cap ∆tick size market cap
ts↑ +132.2% 3.85 +111.8% 8.94 +137.3% 42.1
ts↓ −56.6% 3.80 -53.2% 8.45 -55.5% 44.1
ts↔ −5.4% 3.85 -7.22% 8.96 -10.6% 46.6
Table 1: The average percentual change in tick size (∆tick size) and the average market capi-
talization in billions of euros, of the nine defined groups.
In this article a couple of quantities is considered in order to asses the influence of the MiFID II
tick size regime. Every quantity is computed as a per day average for every stock, after which it
11All the results discussed in this article are robust with respect to a reasonable choice of the factor 1.5.
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is averaged over the year to find the average per stock per year. Then the percentual change in
the value of the quantity in 2018 (after the introduction of the MiFID II tick size regime) relative
to the value of the quantity in 2017 (before the introduction of MiFID II) is computed for every
stock and this is also averaged over the different groups. This is the level on which statistical
significance is assessed: a standard t-test and a Wilcoxon signed rank test12 are conducted to
test the null-hypothesis that the mean percentual change of the considered group (ts↑ or ts↓)
equals the mean percentual change of the control group (ts↔) versus the alternative hypothesis
that the mean percentual changes of the both groups differ. Furthermore, to complement the
pairwise comparison of the pre- and post-MiFID II periods, we run a panel regression including
stock fixed effects. That is, for a certain dependent variable of interest DepVar, we run the
following regression,
DepVari,t = β0 + β11+(i)1M(t) + β21−(i)1M(t) + β31+(i) + β41−(i) + β51M(t)
+ Control Varsi,t + SFi + i,t, (1)
where the subscript i, t indicates stock i on day t (running over all trading days in 2017 and
2018). Here, 1M(t) equals 1 when t is after MiFID II (i.e. t is in 2018) and 0 otherwise and 1+(i)
(1−(i)) equals 1 when stock i is in the group of which the tick size was increased (decreased),
and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, Control Vars denotes a set of control variables. Following Harris
(1994), we include market capitalization and daily transacted volume (both in log-scale), stock
price (measured on the close) and volatility (measured as the daily sum of squared one minute
mid price returns) as control variables. Finally, SFi denotes the stock fixed effect of stock i. We
are primarily interested in (the sign of) the coefficients β1 and β2, because these capture the
effects of an increase or decrease in tick size post-MiFID II. Furthermore, β5 is interesting as it
captures effects that are observed since the introduction of MiFID II that can not be attributed
to the new tick size regime, neither to one of the control variables, nor to stock fixed effects.
These are (indirect) effects of other MiFID II regulations, which we discuss in section 6.
Finally, it is known that price formation in closing auctions is highly influenced by calendar
12The Wilcoxon signed rank test is added because it does not assume normality of the samples.
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effects. Firstly, transacted volume in closing auctions is significantly higher on the third friday of
the month, when options expire and indices are reweighted. Also, transacted volume in closing
auctions is higher on the last trading day of the month, when MSCI indices are reweighted and
window dressing effects can be expected. See table 2 for an illustration of these effects. For
those reasons, we exclude third fridays and last trading days of the month from our analysis,
to only take ‘normal’ market conditions into account.
Transacted volume in closing auctions
Day Small cap stocks Mid cap stocks Large cap stocks
Third friday 6.64 12.41 50.85
End of month 6.59 13.50 46.74
‘Normal’ day 3.21 6.61 24.93
Table 2: Average transacted volumes in closing auctions (measured in millions of euros), for
special days (third friday and last trading day of the month) versus normal days.
4 Effects of tick size on liquidity and transacted volume
In this section we discuss the effects of the new tick size regime on liquidity and transacted
volume. In particular, we test whether Intraday Hypotheses 1 and 2 and Closing Auction
Hypotheses 1 and 2 hold true.
4.1 Liquidity measures
First, we will discuss the different liquidity measures we use, starting with intraday liquidity
measures. The quoted bid-ask spread at time t is defined as
Bid-ask spread =
BAt −BBt
MPt
,
where BAt and BBt are the best ask and best bid price in the book at time t and MPt =
1
2(BAt +BBt). The effective spread for a trade T at time t is given by
Effective spread =
2IT (PT −MPt)
MPt
,
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where PT is the price of trade T and IT is an indicator equal to ±1 if the trade T is buyer/seller
initiated.13 Furthermore by bid-ask vol1 we denote the total volume (in euros) on the best bid
and ask, and by bid-ask vol3 (bid-ask vol5 ) we denote the total volume in euros on the first 3
levels (5 levels) on both sides of the limit order book. To measure spread and depth jointly,
we consider the (theoretical) price impact of a market order. The price impact x of an order of
size x (in euros) on time t is defined as
Price impact x =
(Axt −MPt) + (MPt −Bxt )
2MPt
, (2)
where Axt is the lowest ask price in the order book such that the cumulative ask volume (in
euros) for a price lower than or equal to Axt is greater than or equal to x and B
x
t is the highest
bid price in the order book such that the cumulative bid volume (in euros) for a price greater
than or equal to Bxt is greater than or equal to x. This variable measures the price deviation
that a market order of size x would cause (in fact, the average of the price impact of a buy
and a sell market order). Note that for x = 0 it is equal to half the bid-ask spread, so for low
values of x this measure is mainly driven by the bid-ask spread, while for higher values of x
the volumes in the order book are more important.14 All quantities are measured every minute
and averaged over the day, except the effective spread, which is measured for every trade and
turned into a daily trade size weighted average.
To investigate liquidity in the closing auction, we need different measures. By the very nature
of the call auction mechanism, there is no bid-ask spread (as bid and ask prices overlap during
the auction). However, the post auction bid-ask spread, defined as the bid-ask spread in the
book just after the clearing of the auction, serves as an indicator of how scattered liquidity is.
By bid-ask vol1 we denote the volume (in euros) on the best bid and ask just after clearing,
and by bid-ask vol3 (bid-ask vol5 ) we denote the volume in euros on the first 3 levels (5 levels)
on both sides of the limit order book just after clearing. To measure the tradeoff between post
13Following for example Bessembinder (2003) and Chakravarty et al. (2004), we include the effective spread
because the quoted bid-ask spread does not account for transactions that occur inside the spread.
14This measure is essentially equal to a half times the cost of round trip trade (CRT) as defined in Domowitz
et al. (2005) and Irvine et al. (2000), however we choose to measure a market order in euros instead of in number
of shares, because share prices vary a lot within our sample.
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auction spread and depth, one would ideally want to compute the price impact of submitting
an extra market order to the auction, similar to the price impact measure for intraday trading.
However, to determine the real theoretical price impact of submitting an extra market order to
the auction, one would need the whole overlapping order book of the auction, which we do not
have. Instead we employ Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud, 2002) to measure price impact,
defined as the absolute return divided by the transacted volume. In order to use this measure
for the closing auction, we define the closing auction return RCAt on day t by
RCAt = logX
CA
t − log X¯t, (3)
where XCAt denotes the auction’s closing price on day t and X¯t is the volume weighted average
price (VWAP) over the last five minutes of continuous trading. Furthermore, we denote by
TV CAt the transacted volume (in millions of euros) in the closing auction for day t. Then the
illiquidity ratio on day t equals,
Illiquidity =
|RCAt |
TV CAt
. (4)
Note that this quantity measures the price change per unit of transacted volume, and thus is a
measure of illiquidity. We use this measure to quantify price impact in closing auctions, which
is justified by results of Goyenko et al. (2009), who find that the illiquidity ratio is a proper
measure of price impact.
4.2 Results for liquidity
Table 6 shows the intraday liquidity measures for every group pre- and post-MiFID II and the
average increase of the measure per group. The results suggest that an increase (decrease) in
tick size leads to an increase (decrease) in bid-ask spread (both quoted and effective) and an
increase in the volumes in the limit order book (confirmed up to 5 levels deep). This observation
is confirmed by the regression results, which are shown in table 7. The coefficient β1 for an
increase in tick size (β2 for a decrease in tick size) is found to be significantly positive (negative)
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for bid-ask spread, effective spread and order book volumes for all market cap groups. To check
if an increase in depth can offset the increase in spread, we look at the theoretical price impact.
The coefficients β1 (corresponding to an increase in tick size) in table 7 for price impacts are
significantly positive for market orders up to 50,000 euros for large caps and mid caps and up
to 10,000 euros for small caps, while the coefficients β2 for price impacts are all significantly
negative. This indicates that the increase in depth is not able to offset the increase in bid-ask
spread completely (only for larger orders). We conclude that an increase (decrease) in tick size
has a negative (positive) effect on intraday liquidity, except for large orders. This implies that
Intraday Hypothesis 1 is confirmed for the most part. However, we do not find a decrease in
liquidity for large orders after a tick size reduction, hence the decrease in spread compensates
for the decrease in depth in this case.
[Insert tables 6 and 7 here.]
Results are different when liquidity in the closing auction is considered. In table 8 descriptive
statistics and in table 9 regression results for the closing auction liquidity measures are shown.
For large cap stocks, an increase in tick size is associated with only a small increase in post
auction bid-ask spread, as is shown by the fact that β1 = 0.451, much lower than the effect
observed in intraday trading (β1 = 2.251, table 7). On the other hand, the coefficient β2 for
large caps whose tick size decreased equals −2.133, which is more comparable to the intraday
continuous trading effect for large caps (β2 = −2.589, table 7). Similar (but even stronger)
effects are observed for mid and small caps, where the post auction spread does not increase
after an increase in tick size. The differences with results for continuous trading are explained
by the observation that post auction spreads are in general higher than intraday bid-ask spreads
(compare the values for bid-ask spread in table 6 and post auction spread in table 8), causing
that the tick size is rarely a binding constraint for the post auction spread.15 Although results
for the spread differ between intraday and closing auction trading, results for depth are very
15To illustrate this, in 2017 only 10.96% of the stocks in our sample had an average post auction spread (over
the year 2017) below 1.25 tick sizes, while 25.05% of the stocks had an average intraday bid-ask spread below
1.25 tick sizes (in both cases, these stocks only belonged to the groups ts↔ or ts↓). In 2018, these percentages
changed to 2.99% for post auction spreads and 4.88% for intraday spreads indicating the new tick size regime
lead to more suitable tick sizes that are less binding the spread.
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similar. Also in case of auction trading, volumes in the order book increase (decrease) following
an increase (decrease) in tick size, as can be seen from the significantly positive values for β1 (and
significantly negative β2) in table 9 for all market cap groups. The fact that depth strongly
increases with an increase in tick size, while the post auction spread is largely unaffected,
suggests that price impact decreases (and thus liquidity improves) when the tick size increases.
This is confirmed by the results for the illiquidity ratio: for large, mid and small cap stocks the
β1 is significantly negative, showing that closing auction liquidity improves when the tick size
increases. For large and mid caps, β2 is not significantly different from zero, indicating that
the decrease in depth following a tick size decrease did not harm liquidity. However, for small
caps the β2 for illiquidity is significant and positive, showing a decrease in tick size negatively
affected closing auction liquidity. We conclude that Closing Auction Hypothesis 1 holds true
for the most part: indeed depth is positively (negatively) affected by an increase (decrease) in
tick size, but post auction spreads do not increase with an increase in tick size (only slightly
for large caps). This leads to an improvement in closing auction liquidity after an increase in
tick size, but negative effects of a decrease in tick size are only observed for small cap stocks.
[Insert tables 8 and 9 here.]
4.3 Results for transacted volume
The results in table 7 on transacted volume show that an increase (decrease) of the minimum
tick size has a positive (negative) effect on the intraday transacted volume. For all market
cap groups the coefficient β2 for a decrease in tick size is significantly negative and for small
and large caps the coefficient β1 for an increase in tick size is significantly positive. So we find
evidence that intraday transacted volume increases with an increase in tick size, and vice versa,
causing us to reject Intraday Hypothesis 2. A possible explanation of this observation is that
the higher transacted volumes are caused by high frequency traders (HFT). Several studies (see
e.g. Hagstro¨mer and Norde´n (2013); O’Hara et al. (2018); Yao and Ye (2018)) show that a
higher tick size is more attractive for HFT-strategies, as it implies a higher bid-ask spread and
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increases the importancy of time priority. This possibly caused a shift of HFT activity towards
stocks with a high tick size in the new regime. Another explanation is the simple mechanical
argument by Chiarella and Iori (2002), who argue that a higher tick size causes more orders to
collapse into the same price level, leading to higher transacted volumes.
As already discussed in section 2, this latter argument is more appealing in case of the call auc-
tion mechanism, where less interaction is possible and this type of mechanical effects should be
stronger. Indeed, we find that an increase (decrease) in tick size is associated with an increase
(decrease) in transacted volume in the closing auction, as is shown by the significantly positive
values for β1 and significantly negative values for β2 in table 9, for transacted volume. Also, the
effect is stronger in the closing auction than for intraday continuous trading (as is seen from
the coefficients that are higher in absolute value for the closing auction), supporting the above-
mentioned mechanical argument. We conclude that Closing Auction Hypothesis 2 holds true.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the post-MiFID II coefficient β5 in table 9 is highly positive and
significant for transacted volume in closing auctions, showing that auction volumes increased
heavily since MiFID II, independent of the new tick size regime, a fact that is investigated in
more depth in section 6.
5 Effects of tick size on volatility and market stability
In this section we examine the effects of the new tick size regime on volatility and market
stability, by testing whether Intraday Hypotheses 3 and 4 and Closing Auction Hypotheses 3
and 4 hold true.
5.1 Results for volatility
In panel A of table 10 intraday volatility and market stability measures are shown. Here,
volatility is measured as the daily sum of squared one minute mid price returns. The values
suggest a positive relationship between volatility and tick size. This is partially confirmed by
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the regression results that are shown in panel A of table 11: for large cap stocks the coefficient
β1 (associated with an increased tick size) is significantly positive and β2 (for a decrease in
tick size) is significantly negative, indicating that tick size and volatility are indeed positively
related. However, for mid cap stocks this relationship is only significant for a decrease in tick
size and for small cap stocks only for an increase in tick size. Moreover, although the coefficients
are statistically significant, they are not economically: for example, an increase in tick size is
for large cap stocks only associated with a 4.5 basis points increase in daily volatility. So we
conclude that Intraday Hypothesis 3 holds true for large cap stocks and only partially for mid
and small cap stocks, but that observed effects are minimal.
Similar effects are observed when we consider the closing auction. To measure price deviations
in the closing auction, we look at the absolute value of the closing auction return (as defined in
equation (3)). The absolute auction return is weakly affected by the new tick size regime: the
results in panel B of table 11 show that higher (lower) tick sizes lead to higher (lower) absolute
auction returns, indicated by positive values for β1 and negative values for β2 in table 11, for
all market cap groups. However, β1 is only significant for large cap stocks and β2 only for
large and mid cap stocks. We conclude that Closing Auction Hypothesis 3 only holds true for
large caps and that observed effects are rather weak. Noteworthy, the values for β5 for absolute
auction returns in panel B of tabel 11 are all highly positive and significant, indicating closing
price deviations have increased substantially since MiFID II, a fact that is investigated more
thoroughly in section 6.
[Insert tables 10 and 11 here.]
5.2 Results for market stability
To create a more stable market microstructure (which is one of the goals of MiFID II), a lower
number of bid-ask price changes and a lower number of (small) trades, combined with a higher
trade size are desired. The results in panel A of table 10 indicate that for small, mid and large
cap stocks an increase (decrease) in tick size has a negative (positive) effect on the number of
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best bid-ask price changes. This is confirmed by the regression results in panel A of table 11,
where it is shown that the β1 for the number of bid-ask price updates is significantly negative
for all market cap groups and the β2 is significantly positive. A similar effect we observe for the
closing auction, where the number of indication price updates significantly decreases (increases)
with an increase (decrease) in tick size, as is seen from the negative and significant coefficients
β1 (and the positive and significant coefficients β2), for all market cap groups in panel B of
table 11.
Another important metric to measure the activity in the market, is the number of intraday
trades. We document a negative relationship between tick size and the number of trades, as
the coefficient β1 for the number of trades in table 11 is negative and significant for all market
cap groups, while β2 is positive and significant. This does not imply a negative relationship
between tick size and transacted volume (cf. section 4). It just means that the average size of
trades increases with an increase of the minimum tick size, as becomes clear from the average
trade size values in panel A of table 10 and the regression coefficients in panel A of table 11
that are significantly positive (negative) for an increase (decrease) in tick size. In light of the
discussed results, we conclude that an increase in tick size positively affects the stability of the
market, while a decrease in tick size has an adverse effect on market stability, for both intraday
continuous trading and the closing auction. It is thus concluded that Intraday Hypothesis 4
and Closing Auction Hypothesis 4 both hold true.
6 MiFID II effects beyond the new tick size regime
In this section post-MiFID II effects that can not be attributed to the new tick size regime are
discussed. To detect those effects, we consider the values for β5 in tables 7, 9 and 11, because
the coefficient β5 is associated with post-MiFID II effects that are not explained by the new tick
size regime, stock fixed effects or one of the control variables. Although some of the values for
β5 for intraday quantities in table 7 and panel A of table 11 are statistically significant, none of
them is relatively large (compared to values of β1 and β2, or to average values in tables 6 and
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10), indicating that MiFID II effects not caused by the tick size regime are minimal for intraday
continuous trading. On the other hand, both statistically and economically significant effects
are observed in the closing auction, which is indicated by relatively high values for β5 in table
9 and panel B of table 11. Most remarkable, transacted volumes and liquidity in the closing
auction increased heavily, as well as closing price deviations. This suggests that the closing
auction is more heavily affected by the other MiFID II regulations than intraday continuous
trading. In this section, we shed some light on these effects.
6.1 Transacted volume in the closing auction
The last column of table 9 shows that the β5 coefficient is both statistically and economically
significant for transacted volume in the closing auction. For example, for large cap stocks β5
equals 0.229, indicating an additional increase in auction volume of 22.9% since MiFID II that
can not be explained by tick size effects, stock fixed effects or control variables such as volatility.
For mid and small cap stocks even higher values for β5 are reported. While auction volume has
increased strongly since MiFID II, intraday volume has only increased slightly, as can be seen
from the lower values for β5 of transacted volume in table 7. These two effects together lead to
a significant increase in the fraction of total volume that is transacted in the closing auction. In
figure 1 it is illustrated that this increase in importance of the closing auction already started
before 2018, but was amplified after the introduction of MiFID II (the vertical black line in the
figure).
There are a few possible explanations for this observation. In particular there are two parts of
MiFID II that seem reasonable causes of this shift towards the closing auction: the restrictions
on dark pools (DVC rule) and the best execution rule. As trading in the closing auction is
far more similar to dark pool trading than continuous trading, a reasonable explanation of the
observed effect would be that volume moved from dark pools to closing auctions. However, our
analysis in appendix B shows that there is no evidence that this is the case, in line with Johann
et al. (2019). Under the best execution rule, intermediaries are obliged to execute a client’s order
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Figure 1: How the closing auction volume/total transacted volume-ratio increased
in 2018 with respect to 2017. The vertical black line denotes the introduction of
MiFID II on January 3rd 2018.
against the best possible price. Moreover, their obligations to report the details of the execution
have increased strongly in MiFID II regulations. Interestingly, trading in the closing auction
makes fulfillment of this reporting obligation a lot easier, since the closing auction offers a single
price against which all transactions are executed. Also, during the closing auction there are no
transactions, so it is unclear what the best price is. As it is impossible for market participants to
determine the best price, they might refrain from trading (on other venues) during the closing
auction and instead wait to trade on the close.
Independent of MiFID II, the increase of volumes in the closing auction is already going on
for some time and is related to the increase of passive investing in the past years and the
growing use of exchange traded funds (ETFs) in particular. The increase in passive investing is
associated with a higher amount of market-on-close orders, consistent with an aim for minimal
tracking errors16 (see Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2019) and Wu (2019)). So, if the increase
in closing auction volume is mainly caused by the increase in passive investing, it should be
16A market-on-close order is a market order that is executed in the closing auction, it thus automatically serves
for the need of minimal tracking error, as the order is for sure executed against the benchmarking closing price.
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driven by an increase in market order volume. However, figure 2 shows this is not the case:
the increase in volume is mainly driven by an increase in executed limit order volume. Notice
2017-07 2017-09 2017-11 2018-01 2018-03 2018-05 2018-07 2018-09 2018-11 2019-01
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1e7
6 month moving average, auction volume
6 month moving average, market order volume
6 month moving average, limit order volume
Figure 2: How the transacted volume (in euros) and the executed market- and
limit-order volumes (in euros) increased since the introduction of MiFID II (the
solid black line denotes the introduction of MiFID II). The figure shows moving
averages computed over all STOXX600 constituents traded on Euronext. Clearly,
the increase in auction volume is mainly driven by an increase in executed limit
order volume
that market-on-close volume does not contribute to price formation much, as market orders on
both sides of the market are executed against each other without affecting the price formation
process. This is in line with Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2019) and Wu (2019), who show
that increased passive investing and the associated market-on-close volume lead to inefficient
closing prices. Also, in the setting of continuous trading, Ben-David et al. (2018) show that
high ETF ownership is associated with less efficient prices. In the next subsections we examine
efficiency of price formation in the closing auction, pre- and post-MiFID II, in order to find out
if the observed extra volume contributes to more efficient price formation.
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6.2 Efficiency of the price formation process
We already highlighted in section 5.1 that absolute auction returns have increased since MiFID
II, as pointed out by the significant and positive values of the post-MiFID II coefficient β5 for
absolute auction returns in panel B of table 11. For all market cap groups, the coefficient β5 is
around 3 basis points (bps), indicating a post-MiFID II increase in closing price deviations by 3
bps, that can not be explained by the tick size regime, stock fixed effects or intraday volatility.
From this, one could at first sight naively conclude that price formation in closing auctions has
become less efficient. Indeed, higher absolute returns could indicate more noise in the closing
prices and hence a less efficient price formation process. However, if the higher returns were
generally in the right direction (that is, towards the ‘efficient price’), it would actually mean
that price formation in closing auctions became more efficient. In order to decide which of the
two is the case, we look at the mean reversion the day after an auction with a high absolute
return (higher than 10 bps).17 If the next day a correction takes place, this is a sign that the
closing price was not efficient. To make this rigorous, we define the overnight return Rt,t+1 from
day t to day t+ 1 by
Rt,t+1 = log X¯t+1 − logXCAt , (5)
where XCAt denotes the closing price on day t and X¯t+1 is the volume weighted average price
over the last five minutes of continuous trading on day t+ 1. Note that this is the return made
from the closing price on day t to the last five minutes of continuous trading before the closing
auction on day t+ 1.18 We estimate the following simple linear regression model,
Rt,t+1 = c+ bR
CA
t + t, (6)
17Reported results do not radically change if this boundary is changed to e.g. 5 bps or 30 bps, but we want to
exclude auctions with very low returns, as reversion is not well-defined when a return close to 0 is made in the
auction.
18We differ in this definition from other studies, where the overnight return is measured from close on day t
to open on day t+ 1 (see e.g. Lou et al. (2018) or Hendershott et al. (2020)), because the opening auction is not
comparable to the closing auction at all in terms of transacted volume. In the closing auction on average around
30% of the daily volume is transacted, while the opening auction accounts for less than 1% on average. Results
are similar but less distinctive, when we instead measure the overnight return until open.
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for all days t with an absolute auction return |RCAt | above 10 bps, where the auction return
RCAt is defined as in equation (3). The quantity of interest is the coefficient b, which measures if
overnight mean reversion takes place: if b is significantly below zero, it means that the returns
made in the closing auction are (partially) reverted the next trading day. If b is not significantly
different from zero, it means that there is no linear correlation between the closing auction return
and the following overnight return. In the first column of table 3 the estimated values of b are
displayed, over 2017 and 2018, for small, mid and large cap stocks. The results make clear that
over 2017 closing auction returns and following overnight returns were significantly negatively
correlated, meaning that large absolute returns in the closing auction were partially corrected
the next day. However, this effect completely vanished in 2018, as it is seen that the mean
reversion coefficient b is not significantly different from zero for small, mid and large caps. It is
thus concluded that closing prices have become efficient in 2018, while they where significantly
inefficient in 2017. The other columns in table 3 show the results when we double sort the
stocks for tick size groups, making clear that the observed effects are not related to the new
tick size regime.
Mean reversion coefficients
All ts↔(control group) ts↑ ts↓
2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018
Large caps −0.297∗ 0.0265 −0.141∗ 0.0092 −0.402∗ 0.0129 −0.329∗ 0.125
Mid caps −0.286∗ −0.00996 −0.175∗ 0.0120 −0.449∗ 0.000212 −0.2302∗ 0.119
Small caps −0.203∗ 0.0658 −0.1492∗ 0.1416 −0.367∗ −0.171∗ −0.1371∗ 0.2498∗
Table 3: How the mean reversion coefficient b of the model in equation (6), changed in 2018
compared to 2017, for auctions with absolute returns higher than 10 bps.
* The mean reversion b is significantly different from 0 at the 0.01-level.
6.3 Volume and efficiency
We reported that along with the increased volumes in 2018, the price deviations in the closing
auctions have increased, while mean reversion on the next day vanished. Usually higher trans-
acted volumes are associated with more efficient price formation. Here, we investigate to which
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extent the two effects are related. To do so, we estimate for both years the following regression
model,
Rt,t+1 = c1 + c21Q1 + c31Q4 + b1R
CA
t + b2R
CA
t 1Q1 + b31Q4R
CA
t + t, (7)
where 1Qi, i = 1, 4 denotes if a day is in the lowest (Q1) or highest (Q4) quartile of closing
auction volumes for the particular stock and year. The coefficients of interest are again the
parameters bi, i = 1, 2, 3. Now b1 denotes the mean reversion coefficient for days with median
volumes (i.e. all days that fall in the second and third quartile of closing auction volumes for
the particular stock). Furthermore, b2 denotes the additional mean reversion that is observed
for days with low volumes, meaning the corresponding mean reversion coefficient equals b1 + b2.
Similarly, b1 + b3 is the mean reversion coefficient for days with high volumes. In table 4 the
results of this regression are summarized. The reported values are the mean reversion coefficients
for the three groups, i.e. b1 + b2 for Q1, b1 for Q2,3 and b1 + b3 for Q4. It is seen from table
4 that there exists some relationship between volume and efficiency: in 2017 the high (low)
volume days are associated with less (more) overnight mean reversion, although the differences
are not all statistically significant. Importantly, the mean reversion coefficient is (except for
small cap stocks) still below 0 for the high volume days in 2017. This in contrast to the results
for 2018 in table 4: there is no significant mean reversion after a high auction return for any
of the groups (Q1, Q2,3 or Q4). This implies that the vanishing of the mean reversion in 2018
can not be fully explained by the increase in transacted volumes.
To summarize, there exists a positive relationship between auction volume and closing price
efficiency, but this is not strong enough to account for the remarkable differences between 2017
and 2018. This indicates that the extra volume that has come to the closing auctions since
MiFID II is of a different nature, coming from market participants that primarily use limit orders
and contribute to more efficient price formation. The results are consistent with the conjecture
that MiFID II regulations (possibly by means of the best execution rule) attract professionals
to the closing auction on Europe’s primary exchanges. On the other hand, results are at odds
with an explanation that links the increased volume to the increased passive investing.
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Mean reversion coefficient for high and low volume days
Small cap stocks Mid cap stocks Large cap stocks
Q4 Q2,3 Q1 Q4 Q2,3 Q1 Q4 Q2,3 Q1
2017 0.0629+ -0.323∗ -0.422∗ -0.206∗ -0.299∗ -0.452∗ -0.095∗+ -0.367∗ -0.497∗
2018 0.109 0.0488 0.0286 -0.0845 0.0647 0.172 -0.0513 0.149 -0.0495
Table 4: How the mean reversion coefficient of the model in equation (7), changed in 2018
compared to 2017. The mean reversion coefficient b1 is the value reported under Q2,3, the
value reported under Q4 is b1 + b3 and the value under Q1 is b1 + b2, as b2 and b3 give the
difference in mean reversion coefficient between Q2,3 and Q1, Q4 respectively.
* The mean reversion coefficient (b1 for Q2,3, b1 + b2 for Q1, b1 + b3 for Q4) is significantly different from 0 on
the 0.05-level.
+ The mean reversion coefficient b1 + bi, i = 2, 3 is significantly different from the mean reversion coefficient b1
belonging to the Q2,3 group in the same year and market cap, on the 0.05-level.
6.4 MiFID II or other factors: checking the S&P500
As a robustness check for the above arguments linking MiFID II and the closing auction effects,
we verify that observed effects do not appear outside of the MiFID II purview. For this purpose,
we obtain closing auction data of 250 randomly selected stocks belonging to the S&P500, for
the years 2017 and 2018. In table 5 the average transacted volume in closing auctions is shown,
as well as the average absolute return made in the closing auctions, where the closing auction
return is again defined as in equation (3). Clearly, we see a significant increase in the closing
auction’s transacted volume and along with this increase in volume, a similarly sized increase in
the average absolute returns. This increase in volumes and deviations is linked to the increase in
passive investing (Bogousslavsky and Muravyev, 2019; Wu, 2019). To check how closing prices
Closing auction statistics in the US
Variable 2017 2018 increase
Transacted volume 23.92 37.18 55.43%∗
Absolute auc return 3.87 6.04 56.07%∗
Mean reversion coeff. b (10 bps) −1.25∗∗ −0.693∗∗ −
Mean reversion coeff. b (30 bps) −1.28∗∗ −1.54∗∗ −
Table 5: Results on closing auction trading of 250 randomly selected stocks belonging to the
S&P500. Reported variables are the transacted volume in the closing auction (in millions of
dollars), the absolute value of the auction return (as defined in equation (3), measured in bps)
and the mean reversion coefficient b resulting from the regression in equation (6), when auctions
with absolute returns above 10 bps and 30 bps are considered.
* The average over 2018 is significantly different from the average over 2017, p < 0.01.
** The mean reversion coefficient b is significant on the 0.05-level.
behave for American stocks, we again estimate the model of equation (6). In the third and fourth
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row of table 5 the resulting mean reversion coefficients are shown. Clearly, the mean reversion
coefficients are for American stocks in 2017 far more negative than for European stocks in 2017.
This can have several reasons. Firstly, the closing auctions in the US are less important in terms
of fraction of the total transacted volume (for S&P500 stocks around 7% of total transacted
volume is transacted in the closing auction, while this is around 30% for European stocks).
Secondly, this can be explained by the differences in the auction mechanisms. As can be read
in appendix A, on NASDAQ/NYSE it is harder to act on new information than on Euronext,
making closing prices possibly more efficient on Euronext (this reasoning is supported by the
results of Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), who find that price formation is enhanced when
more information is released). More important, the mean reversion coefficient for American
stocks is in 2018 still significantly negative. It is thus observed that closing prices in the US are
in 2018 still far from efficient, supporting the evidence that MiFID II triggered the observed
effects in Europe.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, effects of MiFID II on trading the constituents of the STOXX Europe 600 index
are examined by comparing the years 2017 and 2018. The influence of the new tick size regime
on liquidity, transacted volume, volatility and market stability is investigated. While prior
research only focuses on intraday continuous trading, we also investigate tick size effects in
the closing auction. It is shown that intraday liquidity is negatively (positively) affected by an
increase (decrease) in tick size, except for very large orders. Interestingly, an increase in tick size
improves liquidity in the closing auction, where there is no bid-ask spread, which rules out the
adverse effects of an increase in tick size. Furthermore, an increase (decrease) in tick size leads
to higher (lower) transacted volume, an effect that is in particular strong in the closing auction.
Moreover, it is shown that an increase (decrease) in tick size has a positive (negative) effect
on market stability, as it leads to less (more) microstructural noise. We also report significant
effects of MiFID II that can not be attributed to the new tick size regime. Most remarkable,
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transacted volumes in the closing auction significantly increased since MiFID II, mainly driven
by an increase in limit order volume. Along with this increase in volume, closing price deviations
relative to the last minutes of continuous trading increased sharply. Remarkably, before MiFID
II these closing price deviations consequently reverted overnight, but this overnight reversion
completely vanished post-MiFID II, showing closing prices became more efficient. This implies
that the extra volume in the closing auctions contributes to price formation and makes closing
prices more efficient. These observations are not in line with an explanation based on the global
trend of increasing passive investing, a reasoning that is supported by the fact that overnight
reversion did not vanish in the US. We did not find evidence that the extra volume was caused
by the introduced limits on dark pool trading or the new tick size regime, leaving open which
exact part of MiFID II attracted volume to the closing auctions. We propose an explanation
based on the best execution rule, which possibly forces market participants to trade in the
closing auction, where every transaction is executed against a single price, making reporting
obligations less cumbersome. Our results show MiFID II has had significant effects on European
stock markets (both expected and unexpected indirect consequences), that should be of interest
to academics, policy makers and market practitioners.
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Statistics intraday liquidity and volume
Variable ts↔(control group) ts↑ ts↓
2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr.
Large cap stocks
Bid-Ask spread 3.87 3.89 3.62% 4.83 6.75 52.66%∗+ 6.75 4.25 −35.96%∗+
Effective spread 4.16 4.15 4.75% 4.18 6.31 48.74%∗+ 7.07 4.39 −36.88%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.277 0.181 −21.55% 0.0784 0.134 93.47%∗+ 0.967 0.253 −67.45%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol3 0.9807 0.7160 −18.87% 0.2037 0.3753 138.3%∗+ 1.657 0.5993 −64.55%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol5 2.625 1.794 −23.20% 0.7308 1.220 118.5%∗+ 7.435 2.300 −64.53%∗+
Price impact 10k 2.24 2.31 5.53% 3.39 4.37 38.40%∗+ 3.51 2.39 −30.75%∗+
Price impact 20k 2.59 2.73 7.26% 4.13 5.11 32.97%∗+ 3.72 2.77 −25.37%∗+
Price impact 50k 3.45 3.88 12.88% 6.02 7.01 30.16%∗+ 4.35 3.78 −14.92%∗+
Price impact 100k 4.66 5.52 18.36% 8.64 9.53 29.61%∗+ 5.36 5.16 −6.79%∗+
Transacted volume 88.61 94.35 7.43% 36.38 41.67 16.04%∗+ 161.09 147.40 −0.492%∗+
Mid cap stocks
Bid-Ask spread 7.01 7.34 8.49% 6.88 9.32 43.93%∗+ 8.30 6.06 −26.07%∗+
Effective spread 6.44 7.54 16.93% 6.23 8.37 40.51%∗+ 8.10 5.98 −24.90%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.203 0.149 −16.96% 0.0469 0.0752 76.56%∗+ 0.323 0.124 −60.14%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol3 1.453 0.9534 −25.20% 0.3827 0.6454 122.5%∗+ 4.396 1.222 −68.08%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol5 1.856 1.396 −15.88% 0.4072 0.7842 157.7%∗+ 3.011 1.173 −60.91%∗+
Price impact 10k 4.32 4.57 10.71% 5.04 6.09 30.51%∗+ 4.75 3.94 −16.20%∗+
Price impact 20k 5.27 5.60 12.66% 6.62 7.65 27.36%∗+ 5.47 4.93 −9.50%∗+
Price impact 50k 7.40 8.08 16.32% 10.42 11.60 25.46%+ 7.43 7.36 −1.10%∗+
Transacted volume 39.56 45.73 18.32% 14.16 17.50 18.10% 58.38 52.54 8.89%+
Small cap stocks
Bid-Ask spread 8.77 9.43 10.60% 10.58 12.95 35.38%∗+ 11.1 8.86 −14.02%∗+
Effective spread 7.86 9.36 20.87% 9.46 12.75 43.33%∗+ 10.13 8.43 −14.01%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.0840 0.0684 −10.76% 0.0532 0.0984 96.29%∗+ 0.233 0.0919 −56.72%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol3 0.4028 0.3101 −15.47% 0.2118 0.4506 191.9%∗+ 1.095 0.3973 −63.96%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol5 0.7954 0.6307 −13.11% 0.4446 0.9322 216.0%∗+ 2.031 0.7970 −61.59%∗+
Price impact 10k 6.34 6.69 13.18% 7.89 8.52 20.58%+ 6.74 6.58 1.23%∗+
Price impact 20k 8.29 9.33 15.75% 10.60 10.87 16.50% 8.23 8.69 6.26%+
Price impact 50k 12.95 14.76 17.85% 16.29 16.74 15.43% 11.98 13.28 9.34%
Transacted volume 15.36 19.65 18.73% 9.73 13.94 35.46%+ 38.99 35.97 9.70%
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the effects of tick size on intraday liquidity and transacted
volume. Variables of interest are the quoted bid-ask spread and the effective bid-ask spread
(both relative to the mid-price, measured in bps), the volume on the best bid and ask (Bid-Ask
Vol1, measured in millions of euros), the volume on the first 3 and 5 levels of the order book
(Bid-Ask Vol3/5, measured in millions of euros) and the virtual price impact of a market order
of a given size (Price impact x, for x =10k, 20k, 50k and also 100k for large cap stocks, as
defined in equation (2), measured in basis points). Note that the last columns of the three
blocks contain the average increase from 2017 to 2018 (i.e. for every stock an increase from
2017 to 2018 is calculated and this is averaged over all stocks), not the increase in the reported
averages over the stocks, see also the explanation in section 3.
* significantly different from the average increase in the control group ‘ts↔’ of the same row(p < 0.05, t-test).
+ significantly different from the average increase of the control group ‘ts↔’ of the same row(p < 0.05, Wilcoxon
test).
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Regression results intraday liquidity and volume
Variable β1 (ts↑, post-MiFID II) β2(ts↓, post-MiFID II) β5 Post-MiFID II
Large cap stocks
Bid-Ask spread 2.251∗∗ −2.589∗∗ 0.001663
Effective spread 2.111∗∗ −2.602∗∗ −0.215∗
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.825∗∗ −0.936∗∗ −0.243
Bid-Ask Vol3 1.011∗∗ −0.925∗∗ −0.282∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol5 0.962∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.221∗∗
Price impact 10k 0.911∗∗ −1.181∗∗ −0.00148
Price impact 20k 0.826∗∗ −1.094∗∗ 0.0388∗∗
Price impact 50k 0.36∗∗ −0.986∗∗ 0.267∗∗
Price impact 100k −0.00180 −1.00∗∗ 0.605∗∗
Transacted volume 0.0470∗∗ −0.0935∗∗ 0.0161∗∗
Mid cap stocks
Bid-Ask spread 2.113∗∗ −2.769∗∗ 0.03715∗∗
Effective spread 1.033∗∗ −3.185∗∗ 0.675∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.692∗∗ −0.772∗∗ −0.171∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol3 0.966∗∗ −0.858∗∗ −0.202∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol5 0.974∗∗ −0.791∗∗ −0.128∗∗
Price impact 10k 0.796∗∗ −1.051∗∗ −0.0249
Price impact 20k 0.689∗∗ −0.839∗∗ 0.00986
Price impact 50k 0.498∗∗ −0.769∗∗ 0.232∗∗
Transacted volume -0.00588 −0.0753∗∗ 0.0637∗∗
Small cap stocks
Bid-Ask spread 2.360∗∗ −3.122∗∗ 0.06397∗∗
Effective spread 1.762∗∗ −3.208∗∗ 0.988∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.729∗∗ −0.749∗∗ −0.127∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol3 1.080∗∗ −0.898∗∗ −0.175∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol5 1.084∗∗ −0.895∗∗ −0.0919∗∗
Price impact 10k 0.188∗∗ −0.825∗∗ 0.279∗∗
Price impact 20k −0.581∗∗ −0.612∗∗ 0.521∗∗
Price impact 50k −1.072∗∗ −0.570∗∗ 0.925∗∗
Transacted volume 0.132∗∗ −0.0937∗∗ 0.0462∗∗
Table 7: Results of the panel regression as specified in equation (1) for the following dependent
variables: the quoted bid-ask spread and the effective spread (both relative to the mid-price,
measured in bps), the volume on the best bid and ask (Bid-Ask Vol1, measured in euros, in
log-scale), the volume on the first 3 and 5 levels of the order book (Bid-Ask Vol3/5, measured in
euros, in log-scale) and the virtual price impact of a market order of a given size (Price impact
x, for x =10k, 20k, 50k and also 100k for large cap stocks, as defined in equation (2), measured
in basis points).
* the regression coefficient is significant on the 0.05-level.
** the regression coefficient is significant on the 0.01-level.
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Statistics closing auction liquidity and volume
Variable ts↔(control group) ts↑ ts↓
2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr.
Large cap stocks
Post auction spread 4.22 4.47 8.84% 5.20 5.84 14.41% 7.10 5.15 −23.29%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol1 1.271 1.259 3.03% 0.705 1.037 57.37%∗+ 1.561 0.979 −67.45%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol3 3.355 3.246 −2.06% 1.827 2.856 64.56%∗+ 5.093 2.516 −46.16%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol5 5.730 5.497 −2.71% 3.008 5.033 75.88%∗+ 8.456 4.277 −43.64%∗+
Illiquidity 0.531 0.491 −2.74% 3.074 1.861 −10.02%∗+ 0.852 0.663 −7.62%
Transacted volume 26.70 33.03 25.41% 16.12 23.34 51.70%+ 19.51 23.38 29.07%
Mid cap stocks
Post auction spread 7.93 8.47 12.85% 7.52 8.27 8.98% 9.17 8.09 −9.14%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.476 0.488 7.73% 0.305 0.489 77.89%∗+ 0.697 0.436 −32.47%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol3 1.392 1.344 −2.65% 0.803 1.362 91.95%∗+ 2.375 1.205 −44.47%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol5 2.438 2.330 4.13% 1.311 2.362 104.22%∗+ 4.203 2.089 −43.55%∗+
Illiquidity 3.352 2.586 −11.25% 6.751 3.977 −25.05%∗+ 2.259 1.875 −7.08%
Transacted volume 5.86 7.48 35.04% 4.63 6.64 67.03%∗+ 6.30 7.50 27.16%+
Small cap stocks
Post auction spread 8.61 10.56 30.97% 8.88 10.04 15.05% 9.36 9.67 5.13%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.285 0.289 4.23% 0.176 0.280 72.42%∗+ 0.428 0.266 −31.83%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol3 0.819 0.786 −1.06% 0.479 0.843 95.07%∗+ 1.366 0.698 −41.96%∗+
Bid-Ask Vol5 1.404 1.345 0.689% 0.788 1.478 109.62%∗+ 2.478 1.177 −44.23%∗+
Illiquidity 8.812 6.497 −8.73% 11.31 7.923 −19.57%∗+ 5.597 5.407 15.95%∗+
Transacted volume 2.89 3.73 41.83% 2.17 3.11 50.24% 3.43 3.56 16.01%+
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the effects of tick size on closing auction liquidity and
transacted volume. Variables of interest are the post auction bid-ask spread (relative to the
closing price, measured in bps), the volume on the best bid and ask just after clearing (Bid-Ask
Vol1, measured in millions of euros), the volume on the first 3 and 5 levels of the order book
just after clearing (Bid-Ask Vol3/5, measured in millions of euros) and the illiquidity ratio
(as defined in equation (4), in bps). Note that the last columns of the three blocks contain
the average increase from 2017 to 2018 (i.e. for every stock an increase from 2017 to 2018 is
calculated and this is averaged over all stocks), not the increase in the reported averages over
the stocks, see also the explanation in section 3.
* significantly different from the average increase in the control group ‘ts↔’ of the same row(p < 0.05, t-test).
+ significantly different from the average increase of the control group ‘ts↔’ of the same row(p < 0.05, Wilcoxon
test).
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Regression results closing auction liquidity and volume
Variable β1 (ts↑, post-MiFID II) β2(ts↓, post-MiFID II) β5 Post-MiFID II
Large cap stocks
Post auction spread 0.451∗∗ −2.133∗∗ 0.289∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.503∗∗ −0.517∗∗ −0.0667∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol3 0.539∗∗ −0.675∗∗ −0.0620∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol5 0.595∗∗ −0.622∗∗ −0.0602∗∗
Illiquidity −0.0551∗ −0.0206 −0.0790∗∗
Transacted volume 0.102∗∗ −0.0729∗∗ 0.229∗∗
Mid cap stocks
Post auction spread 0.0981 −1.642∗∗ 0.587∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.561∗∗ −0.564∗∗ −0.0241∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol3 0.594∗∗ −0.666∗∗ −0.0221∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol5 0.631∗∗ −0.650∗∗ −0.0123∗∗
Illiquidity −0.201∗∗ 0.0473 −0.123∗∗
Transacted volume 0.225∗∗ −0.0968∗∗ 0.263∗∗
Small cap stocks
Post auction spread −0.974∗ −1.455∗∗ 1.887∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol1 0.593∗∗ −0.403∗∗ −0.0835∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol3 0.659∗∗ −0.549∗∗ −0.0657∗∗
Bid-Ask Vol5 0.700∗∗ −0.624∗∗ −0.0378∗∗
Illiquidity −0.140∗∗ 0.280∗∗ −0.107∗∗
Transacted volume 0.164∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗ 0.309∗∗
Table 9: Results of the panel regression as specified in equation (1) for the following dependent
variables: the post auction bid-ask spread (relative to the closing price, measured in bps), the
volume on the best bid and ask just after clearing (Bid-Ask Vol1, measured in euros, in log-
scale), the volume on the first 3 and 5 levels of the order book just after clearing (Bid-Ask
Vol3/5, measured in euros, in log-scale) and the illiquidity ratio (as defined in equation (4), in
log-scale).
* the regression coefficient is significant on the 0.05-level.
** the regression coefficient is significant on the 0.01-level.
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Panel A: Statistics intraday stability and volatility
Variable ts↔(control group) ts↑ ts↓
2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr.
Large cap stocks
Volatility 0.0109 0.0135 17.28% 0.0111 0.0138 22.42% 0.0116 0.0134 13.31%∗+
Nr. bid-ask updates 8603 11829 78.42% 7939 6386 −21.89%∗+ 3293 10998 281.3%∗+
Nr. trades 8111 8546 5.36% 5539 5178 −7.48%∗+ 6570 7904 24.48%∗+
Trade size 13249 12816 −1.03% 8297 9880 26.46%∗+ 25973 20241 −19.88%∗+
Mid cap stocks
Volatility 0.00998 0.0116 25.40% 0.00964 0.0117 24.87% 0.0110 0.0124 17.11%∗+
Nr. bid-ask updates 2730 4230 69.70% 4465 3619 −17.28%∗+ 2043 5717 210.7%∗+
Nr. trades 3094 3486 12.70% 2989 2585 −10.05%∗+ 3307 4047 28.98%∗+
Trade size 12423 12404 3.33% 4929 6391 30.92%∗+ 13642 11526 −16.22%∗+
Small cap stocks
Volatility 0.0122 0.0152 25.27% 0.0117 0.0148 27.68% 0.0138 0.0167 21.70%
Nr. bid-ask updates 2582 3740 62.72% 2589 2109 −17.90%∗+ 2107 5510 238.5%∗+
Nr. trades 2373 2447 8.89% 1640 1586 1.03% 2888 3279 27.85%∗+
Trade size 6716 7190 7.05% 6363 8468 34.63%∗+ 11326 9709 −15.41%∗+
Panel B: Statistics closing auction stability and volatility
Variable ts↔(control group) ts↑ ts↓
2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr. 2017 2018 avg incr.
Large cap stocks
Absolute auc return 12.39 15.05 23.23% 12.91 15.93 24.19% 14.37 14.99 9.20%∗+
Nr. ip updates 163 198 21.81% 108 111 3.11%∗+ 118 182 61.26%∗+
Mid cap stocks
Absolute auc return 13.44 16.48 25.17% 13.96 16.98 22.77% 14.26 15.96 15.58%∗+
Nr. ip updates 84 89 8.15% 66 64 0.037%∗+ 83 106 32.35%∗+
Small cap stocks
Absolute auc return 14.09 17.58 28.75% 14.52 18.10 26.21% 14.39 17.78 25.30%
Nr. ip updates 67 70 7.19% 57 54 −3.63%∗+ 72 80 11.93%
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the effects of tick size on market stability and volatility.
Variables of interest for intraday trading are daily volatility (measured as the daily sum of
1 minute mid price returns), the average daily number of best bid- or ask-price updates, the
average daily number of trades and the average trade size (in euros). Variables of interest for
the closing auction are the absolute auction return (the absolute value of the return in equation
(3), measured in bps) and the average number of indication price updates in the closing auction.
Note that the last columns of the three blocks contain the average increase from 2017 to 2018
(i.e. for every stock an increase from 2017 to 2018 is calculated and this is averaged over all
stocks), not the increase in the reported averages over the stocks, see also the explanation in
section 3.
* significantly different from the average increase in the control group ‘ts↔’ of the same row (p < 0.05, t-test).
+ significantly different from the average increase of the control group ‘ts↔’ of the same row (p < 0.05, Wilcoxon
test).
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Panel A: Regression results intraday stability and volatility
Variable β1 (ts↑, post-MiFID II) β2(ts↓, post-MiFID II) β5 Post-MiFID II
Large cap stocks
Volatility 0.000451∗∗ −0.000344∗∗ 0.00159∗∗
Nr. bid-ask updates −5774∗∗ 4432∗∗ 3176∗∗
Nr. trades −1078∗∗ 1279∗∗ 22.75
Trade size 1621.73∗∗ −4982.52∗∗ −555.29∗∗
Mid cap stocks
Volatility 3.56 ∗ 10−5 −0.000797∗∗ 0.00259∗∗
Nr. bid-ask updates −2403∗∗ 2213∗∗ 1175∗∗
Nr. trades −805∗∗ 505∗∗ 1.62
Trade size 1505.04∗∗ −1835.80∗∗ −369.48∗
Small cap stocks
Volatility 0.000344∗∗ 4.92 ∗ 10−5 0.00284∗∗
Nr. bid-ask updates −1826∗∗ 2304∗∗ 900∗∗
Nr. trades −396∗∗ 435∗∗ −171
Trade size 1118.27∗∗ −1887.02∗∗ −356.29∗∗
Panel B: Regression results closing auction stability and volatility
Variable β1 (ts↑, post-MiFID II) β2(ts↓, post-MiFID II) β5 Post-MiFID II
Large cap stocks
Absolute auc return 0.571∗ −2.091∗∗ 2.801∗∗
Nr. ip updates −37.51∗∗ 29.33∗∗ 34.31∗∗
Mid cap stocks
Absolute auc return 0.284 −1.419∗∗ 3.192∗∗
Nr. ip updates −7.64∗∗ 18.34∗∗ 4.72∗∗
Small cap stocks
Absolute auc return 0.276 −0.0107 3.473∗∗
Nr. ip updates −7.29∗∗ 6.25∗∗ 2.19∗∗
Table 11: Results of the panel regression as specified in equation (1) for the following dependent
variables: volatility (measured as the daily sum of 1 minute mid price returns), the average daily
number of best bid- or ask-price updates, the average daily number of trades and the average
trade size (in euros), the absolute auction return (the absolute value of the return in equation
(3), measured in bps) and the average number of indication price updates in the closing auction.
* the regression coefficient is significant on the 0.05-level.
** the regression coefficient is significant on the 0.01-level.
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A Different Closing Auction Mechanisms
Here we will discuss the mechanisms of the closing auctions in Europe and the US and their
differences. As can be read below in more detail, the most important difference is the possi-
bility of cancellations and modifications of pending orders based on new information, which is
possible on Euronext, but not on NASDAQ, and on NYSE only through floor brokers. Not all
constituents of the STOXX600 index are traded on Euronext, but closing auction mechanisms
are very similar on the other important European exchanges (LSE, XETRA, SIX), so we will
look at Euronext as an example.
Euronext19
On Euronext, the call phase of the closing auction starts at 5:30 pm, and lasts until a random
time between 5:35:00 pm and 5:35:30 pm. During this call phase orders are accumulated without
giving rise to transactions. Orders can be entered, modified and cancelled during this call phase,
while during this whole period indicative price information is being published continuously.
The indicative price at a given time is the price that would be the auction price if the auction
stopped at that time, given the current order book. After the call phase has ended, the system
will determine the closing price, which is determined as the price that maximizes the transacted
volume. If there are several prices with equal transactable volume, the price that is closest to
the last automated trade is taken. After the closing price is set and the order book is cleared
(where all transactions are made against the closing price and market orders are ranked based
on time-priority and have priority over limit orders, which are then ranked based on price-time
priority), a phase of Trading-At-Last starts, which basically means that orders can be entered
for execution at the closing price and for that price only.
19The rules of the Euronext auctions can be found in the harmonized rule book (Euronext, 2019, section 4303).
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NASDAQ/NYSE20
On NASDAQ, orders for the closing auction can be entered the whole day, until the start of the
auction at 3:55 pm. Two types of orders can be entered all day, market-on-close (MOC) orders
and limit-on-close orders (LOC). MOC orders are executed against the closing price, whatever
that price is, LOC orders are entered with a limit and are only executed if the closing price
is equal or better than the limit price. At 3:55 pm NASDAQ starts to display the net order
imbalance information. Between 3:55 pm and 3:58 pm it is not allowed to cancel or modify
pending orders anymore, but participants can still enter LOC orders (as long as they are not
more aggresive than the reference price at 3:55 PM, otherwise they are capped on this reference
price). Then after 3:58, until the closing of the market at 4:00 pm, only imbalance orders
(IO) can be entered, which are orders that can only be entered against the order imbalance.
At 4:00 pm the closing price is determined by the system. The system determines the price
that maximizes the transacted volume. If this does not give a single closing price, the system
determines the price that minimizes the order imbalance. If this still does not lead to a single
price, the system takes the price that is closest to the NASDAQ inside bid-ask midpoint. For
execution, MOC orders are executed with time priority, then (if still possible) LOC orders
are executed with price-time priority. The NYSE closing auction is very similar to the one on
NASDAQ. However, on NYSE there are floor brokers that have priority, adding extra complexity
to the system. The biggest difference with NASDAQ is the existence of so-called D-quotes, which
can only be used by floor brokers and can be entered, modified and cancelled until 3:59:25 pm,
regardless of their side of the order imbalance. Also, they are hidden from the imbalance
information until 3:55 pm. At 4:00 pm, the closing price is determined in a similar way as on
NASDAQ.
20For the auction rules on NASDAQ, see e.g. https://www.nasdaqtrader.com/content/ProductsServices/
Trading/Crosses/openclose_faqs.pdf, for the auction rules on NYSE see e.g. https://www.nyse.com/
publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/NYSE_Opening_and_Closing_Auctions_Fact_Sheet.pdf
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B Dark Pool Suspensions
As already mentioned in the introduction of this paper, an important part of MiFID II is the
DVC mechanism which allows only 4% of a stock’s yearly transacted volume to be transacted in
a single dark pool, and only 8% in all dark pools together. When these limits are violated for a
particular stock, this stock gets suspended, meaning that this stock can not be traded in a dark
pool anymore for a certain period of time. The European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA) published the first suspensions on March 3, 2018. The list of suspended stocks can
be used to test whether volume moved from dark pools to the regular exchanges for these
suspended stocks. We split the stocks in the STOXX600 index in 2 groups: a group consisting
of suspended stocks and a group consisting of stocks that are not suspended. The second group
acts as a control group for the first group. In table 12 the change in transacted volume on the
main exchanges from before March 3, 2018 to after this date is shown for the two groups, again
separated for small, mid and large cap stocks. If volume was moved from dark pools to the
Average increase from pre to post in transacted closing auction volume
Small cap stocks Mid cap stocks Large cap stocks
Suspended 31.03% 21.28% 23.82%
Not suspended 25.88% 15.68% 34.89%
Average increase from pre to post in transacted intraday volume
Small cap stocks Mid cap stocks Large cap stocks
Suspended 14.47% 11.61% −1.579%
Not suspended 17.18% 4.227% 4.525%
Table 12: How the transacted volume in closing auctions and intraday changed after the
first DVC-suspensions, for suspended and not suspended stocks. None of the increases for the
suspended stocks is significantly higher than the increases for the not suspended stocks, all
p-values> 0.15.
Results panel regression dark pool suspensions
Variable Small cap stocks Mid cap stocks Large cap stocks
β6 intraday volume 0.0168
∗ 0.0268∗ −0.0188∗
β6 closing auction volume 0.0128
∗ 0.0226∗ −0.0351∗
Table 13: Results of the panel regression in equation (1), with the added dark pool suspension
term in equation (8), for intraday transacted volume and transacted volume in the closing
auction (both in log-scale).
* The regression coefficient β6 is significant on the 0.01-level.
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main exchanges after the suspensions, one would expect an increase in transacted volumes on
the main exchanges for the suspended stocks, significantly higher than the increase in transacted
volumes for the not suspended stocks. However, the results in table 12 suggest that this is not
the case. Although volumes in the closing auction did increase significantly, this is also the
case for not suspended stocks, and the increase is not significantly higher for suspended stocks
(all p-values > 0.15). The same holds intraday: for small and mid cap stocks, the intraday
transacted volumes increased, but again not significantly more for suspended stocks. For large
cap stocks the intraday transacted volumes even slightly decreased for suspended stocks. To
complement this pairwise comparison, we also run again a panel regression, including stock
fixed effects. To be more precise, we add a term
β61S(i, t) (8)
to the regression in equation (1), where 1S is an indicator that equals 1 if the stock i is suspended
on day t. We run the regression for transacted volume, intraday and in the closing auction. If
suspension of dark pool trading caused volume to move to the main exchanges, we should find
large positive and significant values for β6. In table 13 the results are shown, indicating that the
dark pool suspensions did not cause significant volume to move to the main exchanges. Although
β6 is significantly positive for small and mid cap stocks, it is not economically significant. For
instance, dark pool suspensions are only associated with an increase in closing auction volume
in 2.26% for mid caps. Furthermore, β6 is even significantly negative for large cap stocks. We
conclude that the DVC regulations did not lead to the desired result: there is no evidence that
significant volume did move from dark pools to the main exchanges after suspensions of stocks.
This is in line with results by Johann et al. (2019), who also find that little volume from dark
pools returned to the main exchanges after MiFID II. Instead, volumes moved to systems more
similar to dark pools, such as periodic auction mechanisms and systematic internalisers21.
21 The definition of which is given by MiFID II, Article 4, which states “systematic internaliser means an
investment firm which, on an organised, frequent systematic and substantial basis, deals on own account when
executing client orders outside a regulated market, an MTF or an OTF without operating a multilateral system ”
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